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Abstract 
The adversarial multi-agent patrol problem is an active research topic with many real-
world applications such as physical robots guarding an area and software agents 
protecting a computer network. In it, agents patrol a graph looking for so-called critical 
vertices that are subject to attack by adversaries. The agents are unaware of which 
vertices are subject to attack by adversaries and when they encounter such a vertex they 
attempt to protect it from being compromised (an adversary must occupy the vertex it 
targets a certain amount of time for the attack to succeed). Even though the terms 
adversary and attack are used, the problem domain extends to patrolling a graph for other 
interesting noncompetitive contexts such as search and rescue. 
 
The problem statement adopted in this work is formulated such that agents obtain 
knowledge of local graph topology and critical vertices over the course of their travels via 
an API ; there is no global knowledge of the graph or communication between agents. 
The challenge is to balance exploration, necessary to discover critical vertices, with 
exploitation, necessary to protect critical vertices from attack. 
 
Four types of adversaries were used for experiments, three from previous research – 
waiting, random, and statistical - and the fourth, a hybrid of those three. Agent strategies 
for countering each of these adversaries are designed and evaluated. Benchmark graphs 
and parameter settings from related research will be employed. The proposed research 
culminates in the design and evaluation of agents to counter these various types of 
adversaries under a range of conditions. 
 
The results of this work are agent strategies in which each agent becomes solely 
responsible for protecting those critical vertices it discovers. The agents use emergent 
behavior to minimize successful attacks and maximize the discovery of new critical 
vertices. A set of seven edge choosing primitives (ECPs) are defined that are combined in 
different ways to yield a range of agent strategies using the chain of responsibility OOP 
design pattern. Every permutation of them were tested and measured in order to identify 
those strategies that perform well. One strategy performed particularly well against all 
adversaries, graph topology, and other experimental variables. This particular strategy 
combines ECPs of: A hard-deadline return to covered vertices to counter the random 
adversary, efficiently checking vertices to see if they are being attacked by the waiting 
adversary, and random movement to impede the statistical adversary.  
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Chapter 1. 
Introduction 
Background 
In multi-agent adversarial patrol problems, agents patrol a graph whose vertices are 
subject to attack by a set of adversaries. In this problem, the number of vertices on the 
graph exceeds the number of agents and so the agents must have a strategy for effectively 
patrolling a large number of vertices with a limited ability to monitor all of them at any 
moment in time. Practical applications of this problem include physical and network 
security. An example of physical security would be robots protecting some area from 
intrusion by biological or robotic intruders, such as in a prison, storage complex, or 
military base. The problem can also be adapted to network security as mobile software 
agents inspecting computers on a network. The goal of the agents in that problem are to 
detect and prevent further intrusions or probes on locations that an adversary is attacking. 
Problem Statement 
The problem is how one or more agents that exist on a weighted undirected 
connected graph can best protect as many vertices as possible on that graph from one or 
more adversaries attempting to attack a proper subset of those vertices. The agents patrol 
the graph in an attempt to thwart the attacks of adversaries. Each adversary is assigned a 
single target vertex to observe and attack. The target vertices are not known by the 
agents in advance, though they may be discovered as attacks are thwarted. This problem 
is a version of the multi-agent patrol problem (Machado, Ramalho, Zucker, & Drogoul, 
2002). 
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In discrete timesteps, each agent and adversary can perform one action. An agent can 
either transition (or continue to transition) from one vertex along an edge to an adjacent 
vertex or remain on its current vertex. An adversary can either attack (or continue to 
attack) its target vertex, or not attack. Whether an adversary attacks or not, it is aware if 
an agent is occupying its target vertex.  
Each edge of the graph has an integer valued weight value w that denotes how many 
timesteps it will take an agent to transition from one of its endpoints to the other. While 
transitioning, the agent is occupying the edge and cannot make any further actions until it 
reaches the adjacent vertex a total of w timesteps later. 
An adversary attacks its target vertex by occupying it for K consecutive timesteps, 
where fixed integer K, known as the attack interval, is known to all agents and 
adversaries (Basilico, Gatti, & Amigoni, 2009). If an adversary’s target is visited by an 
agent during an attack, the attack is thwarted. On the other hand, if the adversary 
occupies its target vertex for K timesteps without being disrupted by the arrival of an 
agent, the attack is successful. Once an adversary begins an attack, it must occupy the 
vertex until its attack is either thwarted or successful.  
When an attack by an adversary is thwarted by the arrival of an agent to that vertex, 
the agent then knows that the vertex is an adversary’s target (i.e., subject to attack). The 
set of target vertices known by the agents is referred to as the critical vertices. Note that 
if an attack by an adversary on a target vertex is successful, the agents are unaware that 
the attacked vertex is a target and thus the vertex will not be added to the critical vertices 
set. Such a vertex is considered compromised (i.e., the adversary has won) and is no 
longer subject to subsequent attack. The critical vertices are available to all agents at the 
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timestep in which they are discovered. Adversaries do not have knowledge of the critical 
vertices and share no information; they operate independently from each other.  
When an attack is thwarted, its adversary ‘retreats’ but may attack this vertex (its 
target vertex) subsequently. An agent never knows if it has discovered all the target 
vertices and so must continue to patrol no matter how many critical vertices have been 
discovered. An agent’s strategy is a blend of protecting critical vertices and exploring the 
graph for other vertices that may be subject to attack.  
To decide what vertex to move to next, agents use a service interface, the agent API, 
from which it can obtain information in order to make its decision. The agents use this 
information to implement their strategies; they have no access to any other information, 
including the graph topology. The functions of the agent API are: 
• current_timestep() – Returns the number of timesteps that have elapsed. 
• attack_interval() – Returns the attack interval, K. 
• incident_edges() – Returns the set of edges incident to the vertex that the 
agent currently occupies. This is an opaque and unique integer and does 
not provide any other information, such as the destination vertex. 
However, it does identify the edge direction from the current vertex to the 
destination vertex. Each edge identifier has a reverse method on it to give 
the agent another edge identifier which will identify the same edge from 
the destination vertex to the current vertex. The result is that each edge has 
two identifiers, one for each direction. Agents can, under some strategies, 
learn graph topology as they move about the graph. 
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• critical_vertices() – Returns the set of vertices known to be critical (i.e. 
subject to attack). Note that if the agent’s current vertex is under attack 
and was just discovered to be critical, it will be returned in this set as well. 
• discovered_critical() – Returns true if the current vertex is critical for the 
first time, meaning that the agent thwarted an attack on it before any other 
agent did. 
• current_vertex() – Returns the vertex that the agent currently occupies. 
This is an opaque and unique integer and provides no further information 
about the vertex. 
• dist_to_critical_vertex(e, c) – Returns the shortest distance from the 
current vertex to critical vertex c along paths starting from edge e, where e 
is incident to the current vertex. 
There is an additional convenience function, best_dist_to_critical_vertex(c), which 
takes as input a critical vertex. Its purpose is to inform the agent which incident edge of 
its current vertex will get the agent to that critical vertex the fastest. This function only 
uses the previously mentioned API functions to ease agent development for this common 
use case. Internally, it calls dist_to_critical_vertex(e,c) for each incident edge and selects 
the edge with the shortest distance, returing it as part of a 2-tuple that also contains the 
distance. 
Each agent implements a decide method that returns its action on every timestep 
when it occupies a vertex (i.e. not transitioning on an edge). All agents execute the same 
strategy but have independent state. The method’s single input parameter is a reference to 
the agent API and its output is an optional edge to indicate movement to an adjacent edge 
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or not. If the agent strategy decides to stay at its current vertex, it simply does not return 
an edge. No other information is given to the agent’s strategy (e.g. the graph topology, 
the states of other agents, or which strategy the adversaries are using).  
Like agents, each adversary implements a decide method. This method has a boolean 
input indicating whether the target vertex is occupied by an agent and outputs the 
adversary’s action of whether to attack. The method is invoked on every timestep when it 
is not attacking. All adversaries execute the same strategy but have independent state. If 
an adversary decides to attack, the method is not invoked again until the attack has 
succeeded or been thwarted. The inputs to the decide method calls are the only 
information the adveraries receive, they do not share any information with each other and 
they are not aware of which strategy the agents are using.  
Agents and adversaries interact within a single run, which has an initial start state 
that defines it and then iterates over discrete timesteps where each agent and adversary 
may choose an action, as described in the above paragraphs. The start state is composed 
of the following constants: Graph topology and edge weights, attack interval K, number 
of agents and their strategy, number of adversaries and their strategy, initial agent 
locations, and the assignment of a target vertex for each adversary. All agents in each run 
adopt the same strategy, as do the adversaries. During the run, the conditions specified in 
the initial state do not change except for the the agent locations, critical vertices, and the 
states of individual agents and adversaries. 
All adversaries will adopt one of three strategies identified by (Sak, Wainer, & 
Goldenstein, 2008): random, waiting, and statistical. Under the random strategy, an 
adversary attacks its target vertex at random. Under the waiting strategy, an adversary 
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observes its target vertex and attacks at the timestep after an agent has left the vertex. 
This implies that any target vertex left unvisited for K timesteps will always be 
compromised. Lastly, under the statistical strategy, an adversary observes its target vertex 
over time to construct a statistical correlation of how long after an agent leaves a target 
vertex and an agent arrives at that same target vertex. The correlation yields a probability 
that the target vertex will remain unvisited for K timesteps based on the observed history. 
When the adversary determines that the probability exceeds a certain threshold value 
under a minimum predicted statistical error, it initiates the attack.  
Agent strategies compete with an adversary strategy with the goal of minimizing 
successful adversary attacks. Therefore, agent strategies must make their best effort to 
protect the critical vertices while also patrolling the graph to protect the unknown target 
vertices that may reside anywhere in the graph. To effectively patrol a graph with a 
limited number of agents against adversaries that are attempting to attack an unknown 
subset of vertices, the strategy employed by the agent is critical and worthy of research. 
Agent strategies that simply seek to uniformly cover the entire graph become susceptible 
to attack by adversaries that can predict their future movements throughout the graph. 
Therefore, agents should attempt to determine which vertices the adversaries are 
attempting to attack and then adjust their movement to protect them. These two opposing 
goals require agent strategies to strike a balance between protection and patrol. The 
experiment ends when every target vertex either has been compromised or has been 
discovered (i.e., added to the critical set). 
  
7 
 
Dissertation Goal 
The goal was to create new heuristic agent strategies to specifically counter each of 
the three identified adversary strategies. Each of the agent strategies were designed to 
perform well against only one of the adversary strategies yet will be tested against all the 
adversary strategies. Additional agent strategies were designed to perform well against all 
three adversary strategies. This goal addressed the problem by discovering new methods 
to counter adversaries and minimize successful attacks by adversaries of differing levels 
of complexity. 
Research Questions 
The first research question was how to develop effective agent strategies that 
specifically target one of the three adversarial strategies. Notably, results from this work 
on targeted strategies will inform the design of a strategy effective against all three 
adversarial strategies. 
The second research question was whether general agent strategies can be developed 
using ideas from existing strategies for solving related problems as well as new ideas. A 
general strategy would be one that performs equally well against any of the three 
adversaries. In other words, could a general agent strategy be designed that can 
effectively counter all three agent strategies. 
The third research question was how well the agent strategies perform when 
measured against each other, including new general strategies against non-general 
strategies. The measures for comparison were based their ability to protect target vertices 
while having the same constant computational complexity. Specifically, the general 
strategies have the same level of resource requirements as the non-general strategies. 
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The fourth research question was to determine under what conditions the new agent 
strategies perform better. In what ways do such conditions as agent density, graph size, 
graph connectedness, and edge lengths affect performance? Of interest was how the 
conditions influence the effectiveness of the new agent strategies. 
Relevance and Significance 
The problem of agents interacting on a graph was originally formulated in (Parsons, 
1976) as agents searching for other “lost” agents somewhere on a graph; this problem 
was termed pursuit-evasion. Later work determined how to calculate the minimum 
number of agents required to find and capture an adversary on a graph (Megiddo, 
Hakimi, Garey, Johnson, & Papadimitriou, 1988). The problem of agents defending 
against adversaries that can observe the agents to predict their movements and therefore 
exploit their predictability to successfully attack was explored and found that stochastic 
agent movements reduce the adversaries’ success (Grace & Baillieul, 2005). 
The problem of multi-agent patrolling was studied, resulting in a classification of 
many different variations of agent architectures, evaluation criteria, and experimental 
scenarios (Machado, Ramalho, Zucker, & Drogoul, 2002). However, the evaluation 
criteria were centered on a simple reduction of time that vertices are left unvisited; they 
did not consider the potential abilities of an adversary to predict and exploit predictable 
agent movements. An extension to that problem formulation took into consideration how 
an agent will perform against adversaries that can observe and exploit the agent’s 
decisions on vertex movement while patrolling (Sak, Wainer, & Goldenstein, 2008). This 
extension introduced a new variation of the problem, termed the probabilistic patrolling 
problem, by the creation of two new types of adversary strategies: waiting and statistical. 
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The multi-agent patrol problem was identified as a research topic and analyzed by 
(Machado, Ramalho, Zucker, & Drogoul, 2002). They formulated the problem, identified 
many types of agent strategies to solve the problem, and created the software needed to 
conduct experiments and collect empirical data. The problem was structured and 
simplified with an unweighted directed graph that agents move about on in discrete 
timesteps, where each vertex is equally important regarding patrol frequency. The criteria 
chosen to evaluate the performance of the different strategies were based on the concept 
of idleness and exploration time. Idleness is the amount of time a vertex is left unvisited 
by an agent. The three types of idleness of concern were the instantaneous graph 
idleness, the graph idleness, and the worst idleness. All three are defined in (Machado, 
Ramalho, Zucker, & Drogoul, 2002, p. 157) and their explanation follows: The 
instantaneous graph idleness is “the average instantaneous idleness of all nodes in a given 
cycle”, where cycle is synonymous with timestep; the graph idleness is “the average 
instantaneous graph idleness over n-cycle simulation”; and the worst idleness is “the 
biggest value of instantaneous node idleness occurred during the whole simulation”. 
Exploration time is “the number of cycles necessary to the agents to visit, at least once, 
all nodes of the graph” (Machado, Ramalho, Zucker, & Drogoul, 2002, pp. 157-158). 
Multi-agent patrol strategies that can solve the problem were identified by the 
definition of four criteria of the strategy: Reactive or cognitive, communication type, how 
the next node of traveling to is chosen, and a coordination strategy (Machado, Ramalho, 
Zucker, & Drogoul, 2002). Reactive agents make decisions based only upon information 
available from their current timestep and location while cognitive agents pursue a goal 
that is followed for multiple timesteps. Communication between agents can occur in three 
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types of ways: flags, blackboard, and messages. There are four categories of how the next 
node is chosen by an agent strategy, which are based on the two dimensions of the field of 
vision and choice method. The two fields of vision are local and global while the two 
choice methods are random or heuristic, resulting in the four categories of local-random, 
local-heuristic, global-random, and global heuristic. The last criteria of coordination 
strategy determine if the agent behavior results from some central coordination 
mechanism or is emergent (no central coordination). By combining the various criteria, 
we can see that there are 2 × 3 × 4 × 2 = 48 combinations, although only seven are 
actually named and examined: Random Reactive, Conscientious Reactive, Reactive with 
Flags, Conscientious Cognitive, Blackboard Cognitive, Random Coordinator, and 
Idleness Coordinator (Machado, Ramalho, Zucker, & Drogoul, 2002, p. 158).  
For communication types, flag-based communication occurs by altering the 
environment (e.g. writing information to and reading information from the graph’s 
vertices or edges). For this communication type, agents have access to information stored 
at their current location. Blackboard-based communications allow agents to read and 
write information to a globally available data store. Lastly, with message-based 
communication, agents pass information to each other directly, there is no global or 
graph-based storage of information (Machado, Ramalho, Zucker, & Drogoul, 2002, p. 
158).  
Through experimental results, the seven strategies are classified into three groups: 
random group, non-coordinated group, and top group (Machado, Ramalho, Zucker, & 
Drogoul, 2002, p. 168). The random group consists of two of the strategies that patrolled 
in a random fashion (Random Reactive and Random Coordinator), which performed the 
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worst. The non-coordinated group consists of different two strategies where the agents 
worked together in an emergent manner (Reactive with Flags and Blackboard Cognitive), 
which performed better than the random group. Finally, the highest performing group 
consists of the three remaining strategies: Conscientious Reactive, Conscientious 
Cognitive, and Idleness Coordinator.  
The best performing group consists of a mix of the four criteria: random and 
cognitive, different communication types, global and local information, and both 
emergent and centralized coordination. It is important to note that as the number of 
agents increase, the performance of all strategies tends to converge. Additionally, the 
architectures of the random and non-coordinated group can outperform the top group 
when they contain more agents. In other words, the higher number of agents can offset 
the lack of coordination and sophistication the better performing groups possess. 
Follow-on work expanded the experimental methodology and knowledge of the 
performance of difference architecture by creating new graph topologies and new agent 
strategies that outperform the previous ones by using reinforcement learning and agent 
negotiation or bidding (Almeida, et al., 2004). A theoretical analysis of multi-agent patrol 
strategies found that a theoretical optimal strategy can be used as a tool for analyzing 
actual strategies in differing classes of graph topologies (Chevaleyre, 2004). Agent 
strategies can be further separated into the two different classes of cyclic and partition-
based, meaning whether the agents are responsible for a sub-graph or share the entire 
graph. The theoretical optimal performance of both classes was proven. Later work 
showed that cyclic strategies can perform just as well as partitioning strategies unless a 
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graph topology contains one or more “tunnels” of vertices (Chevaleyre, Sempe, & 
Ramalho, 2004). 
The problem of using agents on a graph against adversaries was specified in 
(Hespanha, Kim, & Sastry, 1999), which identified a greedy agent strategy which 
pursued adversaries on the graph. The strategy was probabilistic in that the agents chose 
the next vertex to move to increase the probability of thwarting an attack. Further work 
extended that simple strategy to one where the agents cooperate via global 
communication in order to optimize their movements on the graph (actually a grid) to 
increase the efficiency at finding adversaries among the vertices; the agents make 
individual local decisions that increase the global goal of maximizing the number of 
adversaries found (Flint, Polycarpou, & Fernandez-Gaucherand, 2002). Work on agent 
strategies to predict adversary attacks and thwart them using cooperating agents found 
that modeling adversary behavior using Markov chains is possible (Subramanian & Cruz, 
2003). Further work showed how a Markov Decision Process approach using 
reinforcement learning can enable agents to adapt to adversary behavior as well as 
respond to changing adversary behavior (Santana, Ramalho, Corruble, & Ratitch, 2004). 
The problem of adversaries in the multi-agent patrol problem was further narrowed 
and analyzed to measure the effects of differing agent and adversary strategies when 
pitted against each other (Sak, Wainer, & Goldenstein, 2008). It was found that when an 
adversary can model the agent behavior, unpredictability is necessary to thwart their 
attacks; this is quite different from previous non-adversarial approaches to the multi-
agent patrol problem, where higher regularity results in higher performance because it 
minimizes the interval at which any vertex is left unvisited. Higher regularity is sufficient 
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when the adversary is targeting all vertices with equal importance, and the agent 
considers all vertices to be equally worth protecting. However, agent regularity is a 
detriment if the adversary is formulating the optimal time to attack because the adversary 
can easily determine when an agent will not thwart an attack. Therefore, agent 
unpredictability is important because it reduces an adversary’s ability to formulate a 
successful strategy from observations and predictions on agent behavior. Their problem 
formulation heavily influenced the problem formulation of this paper. Their identification 
of three classes of adversary strategies (random, waiting, and statistical) represents a 
whole range of possible intruder strategies to conduct experiments with.  
The random strategy simply chooses when to begin an attack at random. The waiting 
strategy observes when agents leave a vertex and attack immediately after. The statistical 
strategy is the most complicated; it observes the timesteps that an agent visits its target 
vertex and takes note of the intervals between each visit. Every time an agent leaves the 
target vertex, the adversary looks at previous intervals and calculates the probability that 
an agent will return to that vertex at least K timesteps later. If the probability of not 
returning is above a minimum threshold, the adversary will initiate the attack. Also, their 
research revealed exactly which types of agent strategies perform best against each of the 
adversary strategies under a wide variety of experimental variables such as the number of 
agents and K.  
Similar work which focuses on perimeter patrol rather than area patrol has also 
resulted in many contributions that apply to the problem of this paper. Examples of this 
are agent strategies with adjustable amounts of non-determinism to maximize patrol 
efficiency while maintaining a high probably of thwarting attacks (Agmon, Kraus, & 
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Kaminka, 2008) (Agmon, Sadov, Kaminka, & Kraus, 2008), dealing with malfunctioning 
agents and uncertainty of information on the adversary (Agmon, Kraus, & Kaminka, 
2009) (Agmon, Kraus, Kaminka, & Sadov, 2009), expanding the types of events in the 
experiment beyond an attack by an adversary as a boolean event to that based on the time 
taken for the agents to detect the attack (Agmon, 2010), and finally combining the above 
using a Markov model to create perimeter patrol agents under a wide variety of agent 
correctness of behavior, sensing of adversary actions, and perimeter topologies (Agmon, 
Kaminka, & Kraus, 2011). 
Game-theoretic approaches to the single-agent patrol problem with adversaries has 
resulted in strong mathematical models for agent strategies where the agent can solve the 
problem by reducing it to a hierarchy of sub-problems within basic linear, ring, and star 
graph topologies (Amigoni, Gatti, & Ippedico, 2008). Follow-on work created a more 
general mathematical model and improved the ability for agents to respond to changing 
topologies by sensing adversaries beyond those in directly adjacent vertices (Amigoni, 
Basilico, & Gatti, 2009). Later work introduced uncertainties in the agent’s ability to 
sense adversaries in vertices beyond those that are immediately adjacent and introduced a 
strategy that stochastically chooses a non-direct path to adversaries so as to make it more 
difficult for adversaries to model and predict agent movement, all with a computationally 
efficient algorithm (Basilico, Gatti, & Rossi, 2009) (Basilico, Gatti, Rossi, Ceppi, & 
Amigoni, 2009). 
A deterministic algorithm for thwarting attacks by adversaries based upon the 
concept of deadlines for vertex visitation (similar to K, but different for each vertex), 
where the agent must visit each vertex often enough to make a successful attack 
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impossible, was formulated as a Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP) (Basilico, Gatti, 
& Amigoni, 2009).  
The best agent strategy for a random intruder is one where the agents follow a TSP 
path with equal intervals and traveling in the same direction (Sak, Wainer, & 
Goldenstein, 2008). However, calculating the TSP path with large graphs is intractable, 
so some heuristic is necessary. A novel heuristic was created based on Newton’s law of 
gravitation, where each vertex has a mass that increases the longer it is left unvisited by 
an agent, which performs well relative to other TSP heuristics as the number of agents 
increase (Sampaio, Ramalho, & Tedesco, 2010). Another heuristic for solving TSP is to 
use ant colony optimization, where agents travel within the graph and deposit 
pheromones on the edges they travel on as a form of communication with each other. The 
amount of pheromones on an edge indicates to the other agents how much time has 
passed since an edge was last traversed. When these agents arrive at a vertex, it senses the 
amount of pheromones at each incident edge and greedily chooses the edge that has not 
been visited for the longest amount of time. This results in an emergent behavior where 
approximate solutions to a TSP of a graph are gradually achieved as the ants move about 
the graph (Dorigo & Gambardella, 1997). 
For agents patrolling a graph with critical vertices of weighted importance, an agent 
strategy of calculating the probability of such vertices being successfully attacked (the 
risk) at each timestep, where the probability increases the longer an agent does not visit a 
vertex, has resulted in two well performing two-phase based heuristics (Park, Kim, & 
Jeong, 2012). In this two-phased strategy, the first phase calculates the agent paths, 
taking into consideration the initial risks of all critical vertices. In the second phase, 
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during subsequent timesteps the agent will calculate alternate paths using the current 
calculated risks and switch to the path that reduces the risk if one exists. Further work 
with the weighted importance of critical vertices introduced an agent communication 
capability of passing messages to each other when they are directly adjacent, where a 
single agent is identified as a leader that coordinates the behavior of the others through 
such message passing (Pasqualetti, Durham, & Bullo, 2012).  
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Barriers and Limitations 
A limitation of this study was that only three adversarial strategies and six graphs 
were used during experimentation. The adversaries were identified and used previously 
by (Sak, Wainer, & Goldenstein, 2008); they represent three classes of complexity and 
sophistication for adversary strategies. The simplest class is based on random behavior, a 
slightly more sophisticated class is the waiting strategy, and the most sophisticated is the 
statistical strategy. The six graphs also come from previous research (Almeida, et al., 
2004) and represent several classes of problem domains where the graphs take the form 
of rings, corridors, islands, grids, and otherwise complex environments. The 
implementation of the strategies is detailed in the Experimental Design section of the  
chapter. The graphs are shown in Figure 15 of the same chapter. 
A limitation of this problem formulation was that the only communication or 
coordination among the agents is the sharing of which vertices have been discovered to 
be critical. Limited communication and decentralized decision making among the agents 
is a common theme among the current research as it tends to more closely model real 
world constraints for agents (Flint, Polycarpou, & Fernandez-Gaucherand, 2002), (Iocchi, 
Marchetti, & Nardi, 2011), (Franco, López-Nicolás, Sagüés, & Llorente, 2015), (Alam, 
Edwards, Bobadilla, & Shell, 2015), and (Yan & Zhang, 2016). Such constraints apply to 
agents patrolling the physical world, whether the agents are physical robots or software 
programs traversing a computer network from computer to computer.  
Summary 
The multi-agent patrol problem was introduced, and a problem statement was 
defined in suitable detail to formulate the dissertation goal of creating new heuristic agent 
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strategies. Four research questions were identified and described to guide the research in 
the attainment of this goal. Prior research was identified and described to prove the 
relevance and significance of this proposed research. Finally, the barriers and limitations 
of this proposed research have been delineated so that the scope of the research is clear. 
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Chapter 2. 
Review of the Literature  
This review includes research concerning the multi-agent area-patrol problem with 
multiple adversaries. The Relevance and Significance section of the Introduction chapter 
includes many of the same literature reviewed in this section; it is a broad overview of the 
problem. This chapter, in contrast, is focused on literature that supports the dissertation 
goal, research questions, and methodology. This section includes multi-agent area-patrol 
problems that are single-agent or single-adversary oriented, as long there is an adversary. 
Several domains of this problem will be excluded, however. The related perimeter-patrol 
version of the full problem is excluded. Research more focused on physical robots in the 
application of patrol problems is also excluded as they tend to be more concerned with 
robot sensors and effectors. Lastly, simpler versions of the problem that are patrol related 
but without adversaries is excluded except for (Chevaleyre, 2004), as such research tends 
to be focused solely on maximizing graph coverage or reducing vertex idleness. 
A theoretical analysis of the multi-agent patrol problem which organized the agent 
strategies from previous research found some interesting results (Chevaleyre, 2004) 
(Chevaleyre, Sempe, & Ramalho, 2004). First, it was found that good performance could 
be achieved with very simple agents who are simply reactive in nature and with minimal 
or non-existent inter-agent communication. Second, the agents performed better when the 
graph was partitioned such that an agent only patrolled within an assigned partition. 
However, this research did not take into consideration the negative effects that adversary 
strategies have on the agents’ patrol effectiveness. For example, an adversary can attack 
as soon as an agent leaves a vertex and would have an advantage because it could 
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complete the attack in the interval that the vertex is left unvisited. Instead, the research 
simply focused on measuring and minimizing the idleness of the vertices during agent 
patrol, which is only beneficial for thwarting attacks from a simple adversary strategy 
that does not take into consideration the agents’ behavior. 
The research of (Paruchuri, Pearce, Tambe, Ordonez, & Kraus, 2007) introduced the 
multi-agent patrol problem with adversaries. It structured the problem as a Bayesian 
game with a new heuristic to efficiently find an optimal agent strategy to counter an 
unknown adversary strategy. The adversary can observe the agents’ movements in the 
graph and determine if there are any vertices that the agent does not visit often during its 
patrol. If such a vertex is found, the adversary begins the attack. If the agent does not 
return to that vertex in time, the attack is successful. Once the adversary decides to attack, 
it must continue to attack for a fixed number of timesteps until it is either successful or 
has been thwarted. Thus, this research introduced the concept of an adversary that 
observes the agents and can exploit the agents’ actions, necessitating agent strategies that 
take the adversary’s strategy into account. Note that the problem was formulated where 
the agent was aware of the adversary observing its movements, so their strategies were 
constantly updated back and forth in response to each other’s behavior. This is applicable 
to the dissertation goal of designing a new agent that can counter any of the three 
adversary strategies. They modeled the scenario as a Bayesian game which has a well-
known problem of being NP-hard to solve because the situation becomes a Stackleberg 
game  (Conitzer & Sandholm, 2006) where the agent and adversary take turns changing 
their strategy and therefore causing the other’s strategy to change in response. Praveen et. 
all designed a heuristic method for approximately solving this problem in a tractable 
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manner. However, the research did not identify or measure the results of multiple types of 
agent and adversary strategies when competing against each other and once an attack is 
successful or thwarted, the game ends. 
Game-theoretic models were applied to the multi-agent patrol problem with 
adversaries in (Amigoni, Gatti, & Ippedico, 2008), where the graph can change 
dynamically while the game is underway. Note that this proposed research does not allow 
the graph to change while the agents and adversaries are running but the approach taken 
by Amigoni, Gatti, & Ippedico is interesting because it removes the agents’ ability to 
monitor the adversary. However, a major deficiency of the research is that, unlike this 
proposed research, the game only runs until a single attack by an adversary is successful 
or thwarted.  
The research of (Sak, Wainer, & Goldenstein, 2008)  described three distinct 
adversary strategies of random, waiting, and statistical, which will be used in this 
research. Several agent strategies were created to counter these adversaries based on total 
random walking and modified shortest paths of all vertices with random permutations. 
The strategies could optionally have the agents responsible for separate graph partitions. 
This work provided a framework for measuring the performance of agents against 
adversaries using randomly generated graphs. However, those agent strategies required 
pre-computation (e.g. graph partitioning, k-means clustering, or TSP route calculation) 
and performed poorly when competing against any other adversary strategy than the one 
each was designed to counter. 
A non-game approach was taken by (Basilico, Gatti, & Amigoni, 2009) where the 
goal was to design an algorithm that generated a static deterministic patrol route where 
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each vertex was guaranteed to stay protected from successful attack. To do this, the route 
must visit each vertex before the attack interval has elapsed since the last visit. They 
argue that if this goal can be achieved for a graph, it is fundamentally superior to a non-
deterministic agent strategy, since it would become irrelevant what strategy the adversary 
was using. One problem of this approach is that it requires the pre-computation of the 
route, which would require some type of central coordinator to prepare the agents and 
place them in their starting positions prior to patrolling. A possible improvement would 
be to satisfy the same goal with de-centralized and minimally communicating agents. 
Related follow-on work added an interesting adversary requirement of having to navigate 
the graph to reach the target vertex and limiting the ability of the adversary to only 
observe agents near the adversary’s current location (Basilico, Gatti, Rossi, Ceppi, & 
Amigoni, 2009). However, that work did not take into consideration a multi-agent system 
and was again centrally coordinated. 
Generating a nondeterministic patrol path for agents against an adversary that has 
complete knowledge of the agent’s positions can be done linear time (Agmon, Kaminka, 
& Kraus, 2011). However, their algorithm is limited to a perimeter patrol rather than area 
patrol, which is much simpler. Their previous work also focused on perimeter patrol only 
(Agmon, 2010). It may be possible to extend this body of work to adapt it to the area 
patrolling, which was done by (Alam, Edwards, Bobadilla, & Shell, 2015). They created 
algorithms using Markov chains in a distributed manner, without requiring centralized 
coordination or agent communication.  
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Chapter 3. 
Methodology 
Introduction 
The methodology answers the following four research questions: Can effective agent 
strategies be developed from existing strategies for solving related problems? Can 
effective agent strategies be developed for countering any adversary? How do these 
developed agent strategies perform in relation to each other when measured? How do the 
problem variables affect agent strategy performance? The following sections of this 
chapter explain how the research questions on developing agent strategies were 
answered, how the strategies performed, and an examination of the dependence of 
performance on program parameters.  
Adversary Strategies 
Four adversary strategies were created: random, waiting, statistical, and hybrid. At 
each timestep, these strategies are informed whether an agent occupies their target vertex 
and uses the information to decide whether to start an attack at that timestep. As stated 
previously, once an agent initiates an attack, the agent is committed to the attack for K 
timesteps; an attack is only successful if an agent never occupies the vertex for the entire 
K timesteps. Note that none of these adversaries were implemented to attack if the target 
vertex is occupied, as that would be pointless since it would result in the attack being 
immediately thwarted. The following paragraphs will discuss the design of each 
adversary strategy, in order from least to most sophisticated. 
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The random adversary is the simplest and is the only one to not maintain any state 
between timesteps. At each timestep, the random adversary will initiate an attack with a 
1/K probability; it will not attack if the vertex is occupied.  
The waiting adversary, which is slightly more complex, will only start an attack if 
the target vertex was occupied at the previous timestep and is currently unoccupied. 
Therefore, it will not attack during the first timestep or any subsequent time step until an 
agent occupies the target vertex at least once. This adversary only keeps a single variable 
in state between timesteps: Was the target vertex occupied or not during the previous 
timestep? 
The statistical adversary is the most complex one in that it attempts to predict the 
optimal time to attack by observing agent occupation of the target vertex over time, it 
attacks when it predicts that there is a chance of success. Say a maximal unoccupied 
interval (MUI) is a longest interval of time that a given vertex is unoccupied by an agent. 
This adversary will track the total number L of MUIs for its target vertex, and the number 
C of MUIs of duration at least K timesteps. The adversary attacks if and only if 𝐶 ≥
𝐿
2
. 
Intuitively, it attacks if there appears to be at least a 50% chance that the vertex will 
remain unoccupied for at least K timesteps, based on history. 
The hybrid adversary is a combination of the previous three, in which each target 
vertex is assigned one of those three adversary strategies. The distribution of these 
adversaries among the target vertices are approximately uniform. This strategy is a more 
complicated scenario for an agent because an approach that is good for one target vertex 
will be bad for another (because they could have different adversaries). Therefore, an 
agent must be more general in nature when countering the hybrid strategy.  
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Agent Strategies 
The research method taken for the first two questions was to develop agent strategies 
and quantitatively evaluate them with respect to each of the four adversary strategies. 
Two categories of agent strategies were created: control and covering. The control 
strategies are relatively simple compared to the covering strategies and serve as a 
baseline to determine if the more advanced capabilities of the covering strategies result in 
improvements. When an agent arrives at a vertex, the only decision its strategy must 
make is which incident edge of its current vertex to choose next. The agent will then 
begin traversing the edge and after arriving at the endpoint of the edge, will chose another 
edge, repeating the cycle. The agent cannot remain on the vertex, therefore an edge must 
be chosen. 
Control Agent Strategies 
The three control strategies are named random (control-rnd), least-recently-used-
edge (control-lue), and probabilistic-least-recently-used-edge (control-plue). The control-
rnd strategy simply chooses the next edge to move to in a completely random manner. 
control_rnd_decide = function (api) 
  edges = api.incident_edges().toList(); 
  return edges[random(0, edges.length())]; 
Figure 1 - control_rnd strategy 
The control-lue strategy chooses the incident edge of its current vertex that the agent 
has not chosen for the longest amount of time, incident edges that have never been 
chosen are assumed to have been so for the duration of the entire simulation. If two or 
more incident edges have been unchosen for the same amount of time, one of them is 
picked randomly. After choosing an edge, the control-lue strategy stores the timestep that 
the edge was chosen, it will do this for all edges it chooses for the duration of the 
  
26 
 
simulation. Remember that the API only provides a unique and opaque identifier for each 
edge and does not provide information about the destination vertex and the identifier is 
unique to not only the edge but also the edge direction. For example, an edge that goes 
from vertices a and b will have two edge identifiers: one for a to b and another for b to a. 
ects = map of edge ids to timesteps when chosen; 
control_lue_decide = function (api) 
  edge = api.incident_edges() 
                    .map(e -> (ects.get(e).or(0),e)) 
                    .min(((ts1,e1),(ts2,e2)) -> ts1 >= ts2) 
                    .map((ts,e) -> e); 
  ects.put(edge, api.current_timestep()); 
  return edge; 
   
Figure 2 - control_lue strategy 
The control-plue control strategy is like the control-lue one but differs slightly by 
choosing the incident edge probabilistically, where the edges that have been unchosen the 
longest have a higher chance of being chosen than the others. Specifically, the number of 
timesteps which each incident edge has been unchosen are summed as 𝑆 = ∑ 𝑡𝑠(𝑒)𝑒∈𝐸 , 
where E is the set of incident edge identifiers and ts is a function that returns the number 
of timesteps since the edge was last chosen or the number of timesteps elapsed during the 
simulation if the edge has never been chosen. The probability of an edge being chosen is 
the number of timesteps it has been unchosen divided by the S: 𝑃(𝑒) =
𝑡𝑠(𝑒)
𝑆
. 
ects = map of edge ids to timesteps when chosen; 
control_plue_decide = function (api) 
  ts = api.current_timestep(); 
  edges = api.incident_edges() 
             .map(e -> (ts - ects.get(e).or(0),e)) 
             .flatMap((ts,e) -> n_copies(ts, e)) 
             .toList(); 
  edge = edges[random(0, edges.length())]; 
  ects.put(edge, api.current_timestamp()); 
  return edge; 
   
Figure 3 - control_plue strategy 
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Covering Agent Strategy 
The covering agent strategy differs from the control strategies by: Using a new 
concept of critical vertex covering, learning the graph topology, and being composed of 
an edge choosing primitives (ECP) that is specified when the agent is instantiated. Each 
topic will be described in the following paragraphs and then the pseudocode code of the 
strategy will be presented and explained. 
Critical vertex covering is where each agent takes sole responsibility for the 
protection of a subset of the critical vertices. When an agent arrives at a vertex, the API 
provides information on if the agent was the first to thwart an attack on that vertex. If that 
is the case, the agent will place that vertex into its covered vertex set, which is a subset of 
the critical vertex set. The agent can deduce if a critical vertex is covered by another 
agent by checking if it is not in its covered vertex set. Knowing this information, 
combined with learning the graph topology, allows the agent to also avoid the critical 
vertices that are covered by other agents.  
covered_vertices = {}; the critical vertices covered by this agent 
uncovered_vertices = {}; the critical vertices covered by other agents 
covered_vertex_visit_ts = a map of covered vertices to last visit time 
covering_decide = function(api) 
  v = api.current_vertex(); 
  ts = api.current_timestep(); 
  if api.discovered_critical() then 
    covered_vertices.add(v); 
  uncovered_vertices = api.critical_vertices() – covered_vertices; 
  covered_vertex_visit_ts.put(v, ts); 
  edge = some logic to choose an edge 
  return edge; 
Figure 4 - Covered Vertices Discovery 
The graph topology is learned by keeping state when travelling on an edge and 
comparing it to the information after arriving at the destination vertex. Specifically, 
before travelling on an edge, the current timestep and chosen edge are stored. After 
arriving at the destination vertex, the current timestep is subtracted from the stored 
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timestep to calculate the amount of time it takes to traverse that edge. Additionally, the 
current vertex is noted and the fact that the previously chosen edge has the current vertex 
as its destination is stored. 
edge_lengths = map of edge id to edge timestep traversal time lengths 
edge_distinations = map of edge id to its destination vertex 
prev_edge = null; 
prev_ts = null; 
prev_valid = false; 
covering_decide = function(api) 
  if prev_valid then 
    edge_lengths.put(prev_edge, api.current_timestep() – prev_ts); 
    edge_distinations.put(prev_edge, api.current_vertex()); 
  edge = some logic to choose an edge 
  prev_edge = edge 
  prev_ts = api.current_timestep(); 
  prev_valid = true; 
  return edge; 
Figure 5 - Graph Topology Discovery 
An ECP is what the covering agent delegates to in order to choose the next edge to 
travel on. When delegating to an ECP, the strategy provides it the agent API, the covered 
vertex set, and the information that the agent has deduced: the set of vertices covered by 
other agents, the edge lengths, and the edge destinations. There are many possibilities for 
ECP design and it is not necessarily the case that just one could be written that would 
perform well. Instead, it is possible to arrange multiple ECPs in a chain, giving each one 
an opportunity to choose an edge or not. This represents a layering and prioritization of 
strategies rather than a monolithic design. Thus, there is a special type of compound ECP 
which is composed of two ECPs and asks the first one to choose an edge and if it does 
not, asks the second. This compound ECP can be composed of itself recursively to 
support any number of ECPs in a chain. However, one of the ECPs (ideally the last in the 
chain) must choose an edge. 
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ecp_choose_1 = primary ecp 
ecp_choose_2 = secondary ecp 
compound_ecp_choose = function( 
  api,  
  covered_vertices,  
  uncovered_vertices, 
  covered_vertex_visit_ts, 
  edge_lengths,  
  edge_destinations) 
    return ecp_choose_1( 
      api,  
      covered_vertices,  
      uncovered_vertices, 
      covered_vertex_visit_ts, 
      edge_lengths,  
      edge_destinations) 
    .or( 
      ecp_choose_2( 
        api,  
        covered_vertices,  
        uncovered_vertices,  
        covered_vertex_visit_ts, 
        edge_lengths,  
        edge_destinations)); 
Figure 6 - Compound ECP 
The covering agent strategy is thus a combination of the aforementioned behavior 
and an ECP, the pseudocode code for the covering agent strategy is the combination of 
the previously described pseudocodes. 
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covered_vertices = {}; the critical vertices covered by this agent 
uncovered_vertices = {}; the critical vertices covered by other agents 
covered_vertex_visit_ts = a map of covered vertex to last visit time 
edge_lengths = map of edge ids to edge lengths 
edge_distinations = map of edge ids to destination vertex 
prev_edge = null; 
prev_ts = null; 
prev_valid = false; 
ecp_choose = the ECP choose function that the agent strategy will use 
covering_decide = function(api) 
  v = api.current_vertex(); 
  ts = api.current_vertex(); 
  if api.discovered_critical then 
    covered_vertices.add(v); 
  uncovered_vertices = api.critical_vertices() – covered_vertices; 
  covered_vertex_visit_ts.put(v, ts);   
  if prev_valid then 
    edge_lengths.put(prev_edge, ts – prev_ts); 
    edge_distinations.put(prev_edge, v); 
  edge = ecp_choose( 
      api,  
      covered_vertices,  
      uncovered_vertices,  
      covered_vertex_visit_ts, 
      edge_lengths,  
      edge_destinations); 
  prev_edge = edge 
  prev_ts = api.current_timestep(); 
  prev_valid = true; 
  return edge; 
Figure 7 - Covering Agent 
There are many types of ECPs, which will be discussed shortly, but first it is 
important to describe a decisive ECP, which will always choose an edge. Because the 
covering agent strategy delegates to a ECP to choose an edge and an edge must be 
chosen, at least one ECP in a chain, preferably the last, must choose an edge every time it 
is asked to do so. There are three types of decisive ECPs, each of which is closely related 
to the three control agent strategies but take advantage of the information that the 
covering agent strategy provides them. These ECPs are random (rnd), least-recently-
used-edge (lue), and probabilistic-least-recently-used-edge (plue). Each will be described 
in the following paragraphs, one for each. 
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The rnd ECP will choose an incident edge randomly but will avoid edges whose 
endpoint is known to be covered by another agent. Thus, it is like the control-rnd agent 
but is more sophisticated by avoiding occupying critical vertices that are already 
protected by another agent. This gives each agent using the rnd ECP more time to protect 
the vertices that it itself covers. Specifically, this ECP takes the incidence edge set from 
the agent API and culls all edges that are known to go to the covered vertex of another 
agent from consideration for choosing. If after culling those edges, there are no edges left 
to choose (which means all edges go to such vertices), this ECP will switch to a fall back 
behavior of randomly selecting any of the incident edges. It does this because it is a 
decisive ECP, which must always choose an edge. 
rnd_ecp_choose = function( 
  api,  
  covered_vertices,  
  uncovered_vertices,  
  covered_vertex_visit_ts, 
  edge_lengths,  
  edge_destinations) 
    all_edges = api.incident_edges(); 
    culled_edges = all_edges 
               .remove(e -> uncovered_vertices 
                              .contains(edges_destinations.get(e)) 
               .toSet(); 
    edges = if culled_edges.isEmpty() then all_edges else culled_edges; 
    return edges[random(0, edges.length())]; 
Figure 8 - rnd ECP 
The lue ECP will, like the control-lue agent strategy, deterministically choose the 
edge that it has not chosen for the longest time. However, incident edges that the covered 
agent reports have a destination vertex that is covered by another agent are treated as if 
they were chosen exactly one timestep in the past, which makes them much less likely to 
be chosen. If an edge has never been chosen, it is assumed to have been unchosen for the 
number of timesteps that have elapsed in the simulation. Thus, each edge is given a score 
equal to how much time has passed since the ECP last chose it. The edge with the highest 
  
32 
 
score is chosen and if there are multiple such edges, one them is chosen randomly. After 
choosing an edge, the ECP stores the timestep that the edge was chosen so that another 
edge will be chosen the next time the agent occupies the same vertex. This agent is 
decisive and will always choose an edge, even if all edges have a destination vertex that 
is covered by another agent. 
ects = map of edges to timesteps when chosen; 
lue_ecp_choose = function( 
  api,  
  covered_vertices,  
  uncovered_vertices, 
  covered_vertex_visit_ts, 
  edge_lengths,  
  edge_destinations) 
    ts = api.current_timestep(); 
    edge = api.incident_edges() 
                .map(e ->  
                  If uncovered_vertices 
                              .contains(edge_destinations.get(e)) then 
                    return (ts – 1, e); 
                  else 
                    return (ects.get(e).or(0), e); 
                .min((ts1, e1),(ts2,e2)) -> ts1 >= ts2); 
    ects.put(edge, ts); 
    return edge; 
Figure 9 - lue ECP 
The plue ECP, like the control-plue agent strategy, chooses incident edges that it has 
not travelled on for the longest time, but in a probabilistic manner. Each edge is given a 
probability weight greater than one, which is equal to the number of timesteps that have 
elapsed since it was last chosen. An exception is that incident edges that the covered 
agent reports to have a destination vertex that are covered that are known to go to the 
covered vertex of another agent are given a minimum possible weight of the value one. 
Conceptually, the edges are chosen by a roulette wheel selection and is implemented as 
follows. First, an array with a length equal to the sum of all weights is created and each 
edge is inserted into this array as many times as its weight. Finally, a random number 
from zero to the size of array is chosen and the edge at that index in the array is chosen. 
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While this implementation could encounter run time memory allocation errors for very 
large edge weights, number of vertices, and number of agents (because the array would 
have large length), such errors did not occur during this experiment because the edge 
weights and number of vertices are relatively low. Additionally, the ratio of agents to 
vertices is relatively high. Thus, the array that was created at run time was never large 
enough to cause an error. 
ects = map of edges to timesteps when chosen; 
plue_ecp_choose = function( 
  api,  
  covered_vertices,  
  uncovered_vertices, 
  covered_vertex_visit_ts, 
  edge_lengths,  
  edge_destinations) 
    ts = api.current_timestep(); 
    edges = api.incident_edges() 
                .map(e ->  
                  if uncovered_vertices 
                            .contains(edge_destinations.get(e)) then 
                    return (1, e); 
                  else 
                    return (ts - ects.get(e).or(0), e)); 
                .flatMap((w,e) -> n_copies(w, e)) 
                .toList();              
    edge = edges[random(0, edges.length())]; 
    ects.put(edge, ts); 
    return edge; 
Figure 10 - plue ECP 
Three covering agents are defined that are each composed of exactly one of the 
decisive ECPs: covering-rnd, covering-lue, and covering-plue. These represent the 
simplest possible covering agent strategies and are complementary to the three control 
agents control-rnd, control-lue, and control-plue but differ by avoiding the covered 
vertices of other agents. 
In addition to these decisive ECPs, there are four indecisive ECPs that do not always 
choose an edge. These are designed to be used in a chain of ECPs by using one or more 
compound ECPs that ends with one of the decisive ECPs. These four ECPs are hard-limit 
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(hl), two variants of soft-limit (either vertex or edge focused) named sl-vertex and sl-
edge, and peek-back (pb). Each will be described in the following paragraphs. 
The hl ECP determines if the agent must return to any one of its covered vertices so 
that it arrives at that vertex before K timesteps have elapsed since last occupying it. To do 
this, it uses the deduced edge weights from the covering agent to heuristically determine 
how many time steps past this deadline will be remaining for each covered vertex after 
the agent can arrive at it from its current vertex. The heuristic to calculate the maximum 
estimated distance for each vertex uses the maximum learned incident edge weight 𝑊𝐼 
and the maximum global learned edge weight 𝑊𝐺. The maximum learned incident edge 
weight is calculated as 𝑊𝐼 = max
𝑖∈𝐼
𝑤(𝑖), where I is the set of incident edges and the 
function w returns the integer weight of that edge if deduced by the covering agent or the 
maximum value for the data type (e.g. 32-bit integer) if unknown. The maximum learned 
global edge weight is calculated as 𝑊𝐺 = {
𝑀𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑅, |𝐸| = 0
max
𝑒∈𝐸
𝑣(𝑒) , |𝐸| > 0, where E is the set 
of all edges that the covering agent has deduced the weight of and the function v returns 
the integer weight value for that deduced edge weight; MAX_INTEGER is the maximum 
value for the data type (e.g. 32-bit integer). For each covered vertex, the strategy 
calculates the deadline timestep 𝐷(𝑣) = 𝑝(𝑣) + 𝐾, where v is the covered vertex, the 
function p returns the last timestep that the agent occupied a vertex or zero if never 
occupied (it is never negative), and K is the attack interval. The number of timesteps 
remaining until the deadline is exceed is 𝑅(𝑣) = 𝐷(𝑣) − 𝑡𝑠, where ts is the value of the 
current timestep of the simulation; the output is a positive number if there is time 
remaining until the deadline and negative if the deadline has passed. Next, a heuristic of 
the estimated maximum number of timesteps needed to reach a covered vertex v for any 
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chosen incident edge of the current vertex is 𝑀(𝑣) = 𝑊𝐼 + 𝑊𝐺 + 𝑑(𝑣), where the 
function d is the agent API call (best_dist_to_critical_vertex) to return the distance of the 
shortest path to that vertex. The value L for each covered vertex is calculated as 𝐿(𝑣) =
𝑅(𝑣) − 𝑀(𝑣), if L is positive then it is estimated that the agent can reach the covered 
vertex before the vertex is susceptible to a successful attack. Next, all covered vertices 
with a value for L that is negative are discarded from further consideration, as they cannot 
be reached in time. If any covered vertices are remaining, then this ECP will choose the 
one with the lowest value of 𝑑(𝑣) and use the agent API to choose the incident edge that 
is the first step on that shortest path. Otherwise, this ECP will decline to choose an edge, 
giving the next ECP in the chain an opportunity to choose one. 
hl_ecp_choose = function( 
  api,  
  covered_vertices,  
  uncovered_vertices, 
  covered_vertex_visit_ts, 
  edge_lengths,  
  edge_destinations) 
    ts = api.current_timestep(); 
    k = api.attack_interval(); 
    global_max = edge_lengths.values() 
                   .max((length1,lenthg2) -> length1 >= length2) 
                   .or(MAX_INTEGER); 
    local_max = api.incident_edges() 
                   .map(e -> edge_lengths.get(e).or(MAX_INTEGER)) 
                   .max((length1,length2) -> length1 >= length2); 
    distances = covered_vertices 
                 .map(v -> (v, api.best_dist_to_critical_vertex(v)) 
                 .toMap(); 
    return covered_vertices 
            .map(v -> (v, covered_vertex_visit_ts.get(v).or(0))) 
            .map((v,t) -> (v, t + k)) 
            .map((v,d) -> (v, d – ts)) 
            .map((v,r) -> ( 
              v,  
              r – (local_max + global_max + distances.get(v).dist())) 
            .remove((v,l) -> l < 0) 
            .map((v,t) -> v) 
            .map(v -> (v, distances.get(v).dist()) 
            .min(((v1,t1),(v2,t2)) -> t1 >= t2)) 
            .map((v,t) -> v) 
            .map(v -> distances.get(v).edge()); 
Figure 11 - hl ECP 
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The two variants of the soft-limit ECPs differ from the hl ECP in that they allow the 
agent to return to a covered vertex after K timesteps have elapsed since last occupying it. 
These two soft-limit ECPs accomplish this in slightly different ways but neither will ever 
choose an edge whose other endpoint is a vertex covered by another agent. 
The first way, which is sl-vertex, calculates a tuple for each vertex covered by the 
agent. This tuple is composed of the covered vertex, the edge which will get the agent to 
that vertex the quickest, and the score for that vertex. The score is calculated with the 
function 𝑆(𝑣) =
(𝑡𝑠+𝑑(𝑣))−𝑝(𝑣)
𝐾
, where v is a covered vertex of this agent. Intuitively, it is 
when the agent can arrive at covered vertex v subtracted by the last time it visited it, 
divided by the attack interval. Thus, it is the ratio of how many timesteps will have 
passed when arriving at that vertex since last visiting it, to the attack interval. Next, all 
covered vertices with scores less than the value one are removed from further 
consideration and the edge for the covered vertex that can be arrived at the soonest is 
chosen. If all covered vertices had scores less than the value one, no edge is chosen. 
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sl_vertex_ecp_choose = function( 
  api,  
  covered_vertices,  
  uncovered_vertices, 
  covered_vertex_visit_ts, 
  edge_lengths,  
  edge_destinations) 
    ts = api.current_timestep(); 
    k = api.attack_interval(); 
    distances = covered_vertices 
                 .map(v -> (v, api.best_dist_to_critical_vertex(v)) 
                 .toMap(); 
    return covered_vertices 
             .map(v -> (v, covered_vertex_visit_ts.get(v).or(0))) 
             .map((v,t) -> (v,t,distances.get(v))) 
             .map((v,t,(e,d)) -> (v,t,e,d,ts + d)) 
             .map((v,t,e,d,a) -> (e,(a – t) / k), d)) 
             .remove((e,s,d) -> s < 1) 
             .remove((e,s,d) -> uncovered_vertices.contains(e)) 
             .map((e,s,d) -> (e,d)) 
             .min((e1,d1),(e2,d2)) -> d1 >= d2) 
             .map((e,d) -> e); 
Figure 12 - sl_vertex ECP 
The second way is sl-edge, which differs by choosing an edge based on calculating a 
cost of the incident edges rather than scoring the covered vertices. However, the only 
incident edges that have a cost calculated and considered are those that the covering agent 
reports do not have an endpoint that is the covered vertex of another agent (a “safe” 
incident edge). The cost of each such “safe” edge is calculated by considering each 
covered vertex as well. First, the amount of “time left” after a “deadline” for each 
covered vertex, when traveling though one of the edges, is calculated, formally as 
𝐿(𝑒, 𝑣) = (𝑝(𝑣) + 𝐾) − (𝑡𝑠 + 𝑑(𝑒, 𝑣)), where e is an incident edge, v is a covered 
vertex, and the function d is the API call (dist_to_critical_vertex) that returns how many 
timesteps it will take to arrive at vertex v through incident edge e. In this formula, the 
“deadline” for the vertex is (𝑝(𝑣) + 𝐾) and the arrival time is (𝑡𝑠 + 𝑑(𝑒, 𝑣)). By 
subtracting them, it is determined how many timesteps will be left until the deadline time 
passes when travelling to that vertex through that edge. Thus, to determine a cost for each 
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edge, a vector of integers is created for that edge and each covered vertex using 
𝐹(𝑒, 𝑣) = 𝐿(𝑒, 𝑣) for all 𝑣 with  𝐿(𝑒, 𝑣) > 0; note that all combinations of incident edge 
and covered vertex that result in negative time being left at arrival are removed from the 
vector and are not considered any further. Next, any edge whose 𝐹(𝑒) invocation results 
in an empty vector is removed from consideration as a choice. Lastly, the sum of each 
element of a vector is calculated to arrive at the edge cost: 𝐶(𝑒) = ∑ ∑ 𝑖𝑖 of 𝐹(𝑒,𝑣)𝑣∈𝑉 , 
where e is a “safe” incident edge and V is the set of covered vertices. Note that the cost is 
always a positive number. This ECP then chooses the edge with the lowest cost. 
sl_edge_ecp_choose = function( 
  api,  
  covered_vertices,  
  uncovered_vertices, 
  covered_vertex_visit_ts, 
  edge_lengths,  
  edge_destinations) 
    ts = api.current_timestep(); 
    k = api.attack_interval(); 
    distances = covered_vertices 
                 .map(v -> (v, api.best_dist_to_critical_vertex(v)) 
                 .toMap(); 
    avoid_edges = edge_destinations 
                    .remove((e,v) -> uncovered_vertices.contains(e)) 
                    .map((e,v) -> e) 
                    .toSet();  
    return api.incident_edges() 
            .remove(e -> avoid_edges.contains(e) 
            .map(e -> ( 
              e, 
              covered_vertices 
               .map(v -> (v, covered_vertex_visit_ts.get(v).or(0))) 
               .map((v,t) -> ( 
                            t + k, 
                            ts + api.distance_to_critical_vertex(e,v)) 
               .map((d,a) -> d – a) 
               .remove(time_left -> time_left < 0) 
               .toList()) 
            .remove((e,time_lefts) -> time_lefts.isEmpty()) 
            .map((e,time_lefts) -> (e,time_lefts.sum()) 
            .min((e1,s1),(e2,s2)) -> s1 >= s2) 
            .map((e,vs) -> e); 
Figure 13 - sl_edge ECP 
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The remaining ECP is pb, it checks each non-critical vertex it is occupying to 
determine if returning to it immediately after leaving it will thwart an attack on it. To do 
this, it randomly chooses an incident edge that does not go to another agent’s covered 
vertex and then immediately returns to that same vertex along the same edge, in reverse. 
Each vertex is only checked once and when the current vertex has already been checked, 
this ECP declines to choose an edge. Eventually, all vertices will either be checked or be 
critical and this primitive will cease choosing edges altogether. It is designed to quickly 
find attacks in the beginning of the simulation and then stop as soon as possible. 
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vertices_checked = {}; 
edges_checked = {}; 
struct ReturnToCheck = { 
  return_edge, 
  check_vertex 
} 
return_to_check = null; 
checking_vertex = null; 
pb_ecp_choose = function( 
  api,  
  covered_vertices,  
  uncovered_vertices, 
  covered_vertex_visit_ts, 
  edge_lengths,  
  edge_destinations) 
    v = api.current_vertex(); 
    chosenEdge = null; 
    vertices_checked.addAll(api.critical_vertices()); 
    if checking_vertex != null then 
      if v == checking_vertex then 
        vertices_checked.add(checking_vertex); 
      checking_vertex = null; 
    if return_to_check != null then 
     if api.incident_edges().contains(return_to_check.return_edge) then 
       chosen_edge = return_to_check.return_edge; 
       checking_vertex = return_to_check.check_vertex; 
     return_to_check = null; 
    if chosen_edge == null then 
      if !vertices_checked.contains(v) then 
        avoid_edges = edge_destinations 
                       .remove((e,v) -> uncovered_vertices.contains(e)) 
                       .map((e,v) -> e) 
                       .toSet();  
        chosen_edge = api.incident_edges 
                .remove(e -> edges_checked.contains(e)) 
                .map(e -> (e, edge_destinations.get(e).or(null))) 
                .map((e,d) -> ( 
                     e, 
                     d.map(v -> covered_vertices.contains(v).or(false)) 
                .remove((e,v) -> v == true) 
                .remove((e,v) -> avoid_edges.contains(e)) 
                .map((e,v) -> e) 
                .any(); 
        if chosen_edge != null then 
          return_to_check = new ReturnToCheck { 
            return_edge = chosen_edge.reversed(), 
            check_vertex = v 
          }; 
    if chosen_edge != null then 
      edges_checked.add(chosen_edge); 
 
    return chosen_edge; 
Figure 14 - pb ECP 
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By combining these ECPs in different ways (but always ending with a decisive 
ECP), many varying behaviors can be created that interact with adversaries in diverse 
ways. Many combinations (198 in total) were created with three being just the terminal 
primitives alone and with different combinations of all others without duplicates, always 
ending with a terminal primitive. However, only a few were assumed to perform best 
against the different adversaries, which will be explained in the following paragraphs. 
Each of the indecisive ECPs were designed to be effective against different 
adversaries. The hl ECP was designed to be effective at countering the waiting adversary 
because any critical vertex that remains unvisited for longer than K timesteps will 
definitely be compromised. The two soft-limit ECPs (sl-vertex and sl-edge) were 
designed to counter the statistical and random adversaries; where it is not vital to return 
to vertices within K timesteps because it is unlikely that an attack on them will begin as 
soon as an agent leaves them. The pb ECP was also designed to counter the waiting 
adversary because its goal is to find vertices being attacked immediately after an agent 
leaves them. 
The decisive ECPs were also designed with specific adversary strategies in mind, 
when used in a chain. The rnd ECP is designed to confuse the statistical adversary by 
being unpredictable. The lue and plue ECPs were designed to counter the random and 
waiting strategies.  
Because there are so many possible combinations of covering agent strategies with 
different chains of ECPs, it is not practical to define them all. In fact, it was not entirely 
known if the ECP combinations that were assumed to be effective against certain 
adversaries would actually be so. However, some general assumptions are outlined in the 
  
42 
 
following paragraphs as to what the result will be for certain combinations against the 
adversaries. Ultimately, it was determined through experimentation of all possibilities as 
listed in Error! Reference source not found. and measuring their effectiveness which c
ombinations actually perform best against which adversaries. Furthermore, it was 
assumed that the top performing combinations of ECPs for the covering agent strategy 
would outperform the control strategies. 
When designing the ECPs, it was assumed that certain combinations would perform 
best against certain adversary strategies. For the random adversary, the combination of a 
chain of one of the soft-limit ECPs followed by either the lue or plue would outperform 
other combinations. For the waiting strategy, the triple combination of the hl, followed by 
pb, and terminating in either the lue or plue ECPs would outperform other combinations. 
Finally, for the statistical adversary, one of the soft-limit ECPs followed by the rnd ECP 
was designed to perform the best in comparison to other combinations. 
For the third and fourth research question, the performance of the agent strategies 
will be analyzed based upon the variables of the problem such as graph topology, number 
of agents and adversaries, and K. The exact variables will be described in the next 
section. 
Experimental Design 
The experimental design was to run simulations of each agent strategy against 
adversary strategies under a range of different scenarios. Variables of each scenario 
were: One of six graph topologies as shown in Figure 15 from (Almeida, et al., 2004, p. 
480); the ratio of the number of agents to vertices 𝑁1 ∈ {5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%} and 
the ratio of the number of adversaries to vertices 𝑁2 ∈ {5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%} from 
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Portugal & Rocha (2013, p. 330); and the attack interval based on the number of agents 
and the length of the approximate TSP cycle of the graph 𝐾 ∈ {
1
8
×
𝑇𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒
𝑛
,
1
4
×
𝑇𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒
𝑛
,
1
2
×
𝑇𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒
𝑛
, 1 ×
𝑇𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒
𝑛
, 2 ×
𝑇𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒
𝑛
}, where Tcycle is the length of the approximate shortest TSP 
cycle of the graph (factoring in edge weights) and n is the number of agents (Sak, 
Wainer, & Goldenstein, 2008, p. 130). Thus, there will be 6 × 5 × 5 × 5 = 750 
scenarios.  
The chosen graphs characterize six classes of environment for the agents. The 
Circular and Corridor graphs are the simplest and can represent patrolling a perimeter and 
hallway, respectively. The Grid graph can approximate a warehouse where much of the 
environment is uniform but with a small but complex area where coordination occurs for 
humans that work in the warehouse. The Islands graph can represent the computer 
network of a large corporation with corporate offices, a small country with cities, or the 
Internet backbones of the entire world connecting continents together. Finally, graphs 
Map A and Map B represent arbitrarily complex environments with Map B differing 
from Map A by in the inclusion of barriers to isolate the graph into four areas. 
Figure 15 - Graph Topologies 
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Information on these graphs have been computed and are listed in Table 1 below. Note 
that approximate TSP was calculated using the Nearest Neighbor Algorithm; finding an 
optimal TSP path is not critical for this research. The TSP length is given in both the 
number of vertices and the sum of the edge weights for the path. 
Graph # Vertices # Edges Approximate 
TSP Length 
(# Vertices) 
Approximate 
TSP Length 
(Edge 
Weights) 
Map A 50 105 63 380 
Map B 50 69 73 512 
Circular 50 50 51 178 
Corridor 49 48 97 392 
Islands 50 84 59 332 
Grid 50 91 58 353 
Table 1 - Graph Details 
Each scenario gives rise to multiple matches over all combinations of the agent 
strategies and adversary strategies, where each of the agent strategies played against each 
of the adversary strategies. A match is composed of X=10 games, each of which has 
different randomly selected agent starting positions and target vertices. Each game runs 
for 𝑅 = 100 × 𝑇𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 timesteps (Sak, Wainer, & Goldenstein, 2008, p. 130).  
Data Analysis 
The effectiveness of agent strategies was calculated from the following 
measurements, all calculated from experiment outputs from each game. The two types of 
measurements are raw and calculated. The raw measurements are the number of attacks 
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and the number of attacks that were thwarted. There are five calculated measurements. 
The first calculated measurement in the attack thwarted ratio, which is the percentage of 
attacks there were thwarted. The next is general effectiveness, which is the percentage of 
target vertices that were not compromised at all. The deterrence effectiveness is the 
percentage of target vertices where no attack was attempted. The patrol effectiveness is 
the percentage of the target vertices that were discovered to be critical by the agents. 
Lastly, the defense effectiveness is the percentage of initially thwarted critical vertices 
that were never compromised, which differs from the general effectiveness by 
considering that some target vertices may never be attacked (i.e., how effective the 
strategy is at continuing to thwart attacks on a target vertex without it becoming 
compromised later). 
The game measurements were then summarized into a match measurement, which is 
the average and standard deviation of each of the ten game measurements for a match. 
With each match measurement are the variables for that match and its enclosing scenario, 
combined. The graph, number of agents, ratio of agents to vertices, number of 
adversaries, ratio of adversaries to vertices, and K are from the scenario. The agent 
strategy and adversary strategy are from the match. The result is a multi-dimensional 
cube of measurements that were analyzed to determine how the agents perform under 
varying conditions.  
Summary 
The methodology to answer the research questions was to develop the adversaries, 
control agent strategies, and the covering agent strategy along with its ECPs. Experiments 
were run which evaluate the performance of the agent strategies under many varying 
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conditions. The design of the agent strategies has been described along with the new 
concepts of covered vertex covering and ECPs. The experimental design is clearly 
defined and backed up by prior research. Graphs used by previous research were obtained 
and evaluated for their properties such as their approximate TSP length and application to 
real world scenarios.  
The analysis of the data relied on the defined measurements of raw data and 
effectiveness of an agent. The output of an experiment resulted in a n-dimensional cube 
in data that was analyzed across many different slices to determine when and why agents 
perform well or not.  
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Chapter 4. 
Results 
Introduction 
The agents are named in a very particular way in the experiment results to describe 
their behavior. First, the control agent strategies are named control_lue, control_plue, and 
control_rnd for least-recently-used-edge, probabilistic-least recently-edge, and random, 
respectively. The covering agent strategy names being the prefix control_ followed by 
the ordered list of the edge chooser primitive names, separated by the “_” character. For 
example, covering_hl_rnd is the covering agent strategy with the hard limit and random 
edge chooser primitives, in that order. The names, descriptions, and examples of these 
edge choosing primitives of the covering agent strategy are listed in Table 2. 
Edge Chooser 
Primitive Name 
Description Terminal? Example 
lue Least Recently Used 
Edge 
Yes covering_lue 
plue Probabilistic Least 
Recently Used Edge 
Yes covering_plue 
rnd Random Yes covering_rnd 
hl Hard Limit No covering_hl_rnd 
pb Peek Back No covering_hl_pb_lue 
sl-vertex Soft Limit (Vertex 
Focused) 
No covering_sl-vertex-plue 
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Edge Chooser 
Primitive Name 
Description Terminal? Example 
sl-edge Soft Limit (Edge 
Focused) 
No covering_sl-edge-rnd 
Table 2 - Covering Agent Edge Chooser Primitive Naming 
  
Control Agent Strategies 
The control agent strategies showed clear differences in their performance against 
the four adversaries, as can be seen in Figure 16. The control-lue agent strategy 
performed much better under the general effectiveness measure than the other two control 
strategies against the random and waiting adversaries. The control-rnd strategy did the 
best against the statistical adversary and worse overall against the other adversaries. The 
control-plue ranked in between the other two control agent strategies in all cases, which 
is not surprising considering that it functions like mixture of the deterministic control-lue 
and nondeterministic control-rnd strategies. Overall, the control-lue agent performed 
best. 
 
  
49 
 
 
Figure 16 - General Effectiveness of the Control Agent Strategies 
Basic Covering Agent Strategies 
The basic covering agents are simply the covering agents with a single terminal edge 
choosing primitive. Their performance is illustrated in Figure 17. Like with the control 
agents, the least recently used edge variant (covering-lue) outperformed the probabilistic 
least recently used edge (covering-plue) and random (covering-rnd) variants when going 
against the random, waiting, and hybrid strategies. Unlike with the control agents, the 
covering-plue agent outperformed the covering-rnd when against the statistical adversary.  
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Figure 17 - General Effectiveness of the Basic Covering Agents 
The basic covering agents did not perform as well as their control agent counterparts, 
as can be seen in Figure 18. The additional behaviors that the covering agents add is 
detrimental in all situations when only a single terminal edge choosing primitive is used. 
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Figure 18 - General Effective of the Basic Covering and Control Agents 
Chained Agent Strategies 
Overall 
The effectiveness measurements of all 198 agent strategies against all adversaries are 
illustrated in Figure 19, which has the agent strategies on the horizontal axis but are 
unlabeled. The chart sorts all agents in descending order of their general effectiveness 
average against all adversaries, left to right. The corresponding defense, patrol, and 
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deterrence effectiveness measurements are also shown (also the average against all 
adversaries), showing how they relate to general effectiveness. General effectiveness of 
all agents ranges from about 25% to about 83%, showing a wide disparity in performance 
among the agents overall. General effectiveness is inversely correlated with patrol 
effectiveness such that as patrol effectiveness rises, general effectiveness decreases. 
Defense effectiveness is somewhat noisy but in general lowers along with general 
effectiveness. Deterrence effectiveness is stable and not correlated with general 
effectiveness. 
 
Figure 19 - Effectiveness Range Against All Adversaries 
 
The top performing agents measured by general effectiveness are illustrated in 
Figure 20. This chart shows the agents who score is within 98% of the maximum general 
effectiveness score. There are a lot of variants in this list and while it is tempting to just 
choose the top performing agent as the best, such a strategy does not pick the ultimate 
essence of what combinations and orderings of edge choosing primitives is optimal. 
Therefore, a strategy was used to pick out the truly optimal agent by also considering the 
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number of edge choosing primitives an agent has, in addition to its general effectiveness. 
To facilitate this selection, a simple strategy of choosing the agent with the highest 
general effectiveness and the lowest count of edge choosing primitives was taken. The 
rational for this is that the top performing combinations of ECPs have general 
effectiveness scores that are very close to each other and the absolute highest performing 
agents can have a very large number of ECPs in comparison to similarly performing 
agents with lower numbers of ECPs. However, the larger numbers of ECPs do not 
necessarily mean that these agents are superior. Instead, their slightly higher performance 
is a statistical anomaly and does not capture the true essence of a superior performing 
strategy of an agent with very similar performance but less ECPs. In the case of overall 
agent performance against all adversaries, the covering_hl_pb_rnd combination of three 
edge choosing primitives was selected and is highlighted in Figure 20. While there are 
ten other agents that performed better, they all have four or five edge choosing primitives 
instead of three. Additionally, the general effectiveness of this agent strategy was 
82.20%, which is within 99.82% of the maximum general effectiveness of 83.25% for the 
covering_hl_sl-edge_pb_rnd agent. Therefore, it is argued that the covering_hl_pb_rnd 
(explained in further detail in Appendix A) agent represents the true optimal agent 
strategy, with the chained combination of the Hard-Limit, Peek Back, and Random edge 
choosing primitives; the sl-edge ECP from the covering_hl_sl-edge_pb_rnd agent did 
perform better, but so did the covering_hl_sl-vertex_pb_rnd agent. Thus, it is argued that 
neither the inclusion of the sl_edge or sl_vertex ECPs are critical for identifying the most 
appropriate agent in terms of selecting the optimal combination and number of ECPs for 
an agent. 
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Figure 20 - General Effectiveness Against all Adversaries (Within 98% of Maximum) 
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Against the Random Adversary Strategy 
Against the random adversary, the range of general effectiveness among all the 
agents varies considerably from about 1% to about 69% (see Figure 21). The deterrence 
effectiveness is always 0% for all agents because no behavior on the part of the agent will 
deter the random adversary from attacking. The patrol effectiveness is inversely 
correlated with general effectiveness because discovering more critical vertices (patrol 
effectiveness) comes at the cost of not being able protect critical vertices from even a 
single successful attack (general effectiveness). 
 
Figure 21 - Effectiveness Range Against the Random Adversary 
The top performing agents, as measured by general effectiveness are 
covering_hl_lue, covering_sl-vertex_hl_sl-edge-lue, and covering_sl-vertex_hl_lue with 
scores of 69.0%, 69.0%, and 69.1%, respectively, as illustrated in Figure 22. Using the 
criteria to select the optimal strategy as described in the previous section, the best agent 
strategy is covering_hl_lue, which is a chain of the hard limit and least-recently-used-
edge choosing primitives. Even though this agent is not the absolute best as measured, it 
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is simpler than the top two and within 99.85% of the top performing agent. It is not 
surprising that this agent performs well because it covers the graph uniformly and at 
regular intervals unless a critical vertex is in danger of being unvisited for longer than K 
timesteps, in which case it heads directly to that vertex as close as possible to exactly 
after K timesteps have elapsed. The least-recently-used-edge choosing primitive was 
created to counter the random adversary, so it is encouraging that the results indicate its 
effectiveness. Note that the simpler control_lue and covering_lue agents only had a 
general effectiveness score of 44.24% and 26.23%, respectively, showing that by adding 
vertex covering and the hard limit edge chooser, the performance of an agent can increase 
greatly (to 69%). 
 
Figure 22 - General Effectiveness Against the Random Adversary (Within 98% of Maximum) 
Against the Waiting Adversary Strategy 
When going against the waiting adversary, agents have a correlation between general 
effectiveness and both defense and deterrence effectiveness (see Figure 23). Patrol 
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effectiveness is inversely correlated with general effectiveness. The general effectiveness 
measurements for all agents against the waiting adversary has a range of 0.84% to 
94.30%. The control_lue control strategy performed best against the all the control 
strategies with a general effectiveness score of 49%. The base covering strategy 
covering_lue performed best against all the basic covering strategies with a general 
effectiveness score of 49%. 
 
Figure 23 - Effectiveness Range Against the Waiting Adversary 
An interesting result is the correlation of general effectiveness to attack count; 
general effectiveness decreases as the attack count decreases (Figure 24 and Figure 25). 
Because the waiting adversary only attacks after an agent leaves its target vertex, a low 
attack count indicates that the agent is not visiting target vertices. 
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Figure 24 - General Effectiveness and Attack Count against the Waiting Adversary 
 
Figure 25- General Effectiveness and Attack Count Scatterplot for the Waiting Adversary 
The top performing agents against the waiting adversary are illustrated in Figure 26, 
of which the optimal agent is covering_hl_pb_rnd. This agent is composed of the Hard-
Limit, Peek-Back, and Random edge choosers, in that order. This agent has a general 
effectiveness score of 94.06%, which is within 99.75% of the top score of 94.30%. The 
Peek-Back edge chooser was designed specifically to counter the waiting adversary, so 
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its presence in the optimal and all top performing agents is expected and its contribution 
to countering the waiting adversary is proven. 
 
Figure 26 - General Effectiveness Against the Waiting Adversary (Within 98% of Maximum) 
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Against the Statistical Adversary Strategy 
When going against the statistical adversary, the general effectiveness of an agent is 
correlated with the defense effectiveness. The general effectiveness for all agents has a 
range of about 57% to about 92.5% (Figure 26). General effectiveness is inversely 
correlated to attack count (Figure 28 and Figure 29), since the statistical adversary only 
attacks when it predicts it will be successful, a reduce attack count implies that the 
adversary is unable to predict success and hence does not attack. Since lower attack 
counts result in higher general effectiveness scores, an agent performs best by preventing 
attacks in the first place. 
 
Figure 27 - Effectiveness Range against the Statistical Adversary 
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Figure 28 - General Effectiveness and Attack Count against the Statistical Adversary 
 
Figure 29- General Effectiveness and Attack Count against the Statistical Adversary (Scatter Plot) 
The agents that score the highest general effectiveness scores (within 98% of the 
maximum score) and illustrated in Figure 30. Of those, the agent covering_hl_rnd is the 
simplest and is within 99.5% of the much more complicated maximum scoring agent. 
The covering_rnd and control_rnd agents scored only 79.6% and 78.2%, respectively. 
The much more predictable agents covering_lue and control_lue scored 56.99% and 
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57.29%, respectively, near the bottom of all agents. The only agent which performed 
worse was covering_pb_lue at 56.96%. These low scores are not surprising because these 
agents have very predictable patterns of movement. 
 
  
63 
 
 
Figure 30 - General Effectiveness Against the Statistical Adversary (Within 98% of Maximum) 
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Against the Hybrid Adversary Strategy 
The general effectiveness scores against the hybrid adversary vary from 25.07% to 
83.81 and are inversely correlated with patrol effectiveness (Figure 31). General 
effectiveness is correlated with the attack count; agents that evoke the adversaries to 
attack more have higher scores of general effectiveness (Figure 32). 
 
Figure 31 - Effectiveness Range against the Hybrid Adversary 
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Figure 32 - General Effectiveness and Attack Count against the Hybrid Adversary 
The simplest and highest performing agent as measured by general effectiveness is 
covering_hl_pb_rnd at 83.48%, which is within 99.6% of the maximum score of 
covering_hl_pb_sl-vertex-rnd at 83.81% (Figure 33). 
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Figure 33 - General Effectiveness Against the Hybrid Adversary (Within 98% of Maximum) 
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Chapter 5. 
Conclusions, Recommendations, and Summary 
Conclusions 
Overall 
The top performing covering agent strategies were covering_hl_lue, 
covering_hl_pb_rnd, and covering_hl_rnd. The most effective agent against the random 
adversary was covering_hl_lue, against the statistical adversary is was covering_hl_rnd, 
and covering_hl_pb_rnd performed best against the waiting and hybrid strategies as well 
as best overall (Table 3). 
Adversary Agent Name Agent Description General Effectiveness 
Random covering_hl_lue Hard-Limit, Least-Recently-Used- Edge 69.00% 
Waiting covering_hl_pb_rnd Hard-Limit, Peek-back, Random 94.06% 
Statistical covering_hl_rnd Hard-Limit, Random 92.06% 
Hybrid covering_hl_pb_rnd Hard-Limit, Peek-Back, Random 83.48% 
Overall covering_hl_pb_rnd Hard-Limit, Peek-Back, Random 82.20% 
Table 3 - Top Performing Covering Agents 
The top agent strategies do not employ all edge choosing primitives: only 
combinations of hard-limit, peek-back, least-recently-used-edge, and random were used 
by the top scoring agents. This means that the two soft-limit edge choosers, the vertex 
and the edge focused ones, in addition to the probabilistic-recently-used-edge primitive, 
were not a key factor for maximizing agent performance, as measured by general 
effectiveness. As described in Table 4, the hard-limit primitive was effective against all 
adversaries, the peek-back primitive was effective against the waiting and hybrid 
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strategy, and the random primitive was effective against waiting, statistical, and hybrid 
adversaries. 
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covering_hl_lue (Against Random) X  X  
covering_hl_pb_rnd (Against Waiting & Hybrid) X X  X 
covering_hl_rnd (Against Statistical) X   X 
Table 4 - Edge Choosing Primitive Usage in Top Covering Agents 
When the results of all experiment variables are averaged, the top performing agent 
was covering_hl_pb_rnd with a general effectiveness of 83.20%, which is also the best 
agent for the hybrid adversary (Figure 34). Closely following that are the 
covering_hl_rnd and covering_hl_lue agents, with general effectiveness scores of 
81.32% and 77.20%, respectively. The control agents scored below those and the basic 
covering agents scored even lower. Basic covering agents with only a single terminal 
edge choosing primitive perform worse than their corresponding control agents; the 
covering edge choosing agents only show high performance when used with multiple 
primitives. 
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Figure 34 - Overall General Effectiveness of Control, Basic Covering, and top Covering Agents 
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Figure 35 - General Effectiveness of Control, Basic Covering, and top Covering Agents against Adversaries 
By Adversary 
The control_lue agent shows roughly equal performance against all four adversaries, 
while the control_plue and control_rnd performed much better against the statistical 
adversary, less well on the hybrid strategy, and not well against the random and waiting 
adversaries (Figure 36). The basic covering agents (Figure 37) have a similar result, but 
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with lower scores of general effectiveness, a less equal performance of the covering_lue 
agent against all adversaries, and near zero scores of general effectiveness of the 
covering_plue and covering_rnd agents against the random and waiting adversaries. 
 
Figure 36 - General Effectiveness of Control Agents Against all Adversaries 
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Figure 37 - General Effectiveness of Basic Covering Agents Against all Adversaries 
In contrast, as can be seen in Figure 38, the top performing covering agents perform 
equally well against all adversaries. One notable difference is that covering_hl_lue agents 
performs worse against the statistical adversary in comparison to the covering_hl_pb_rnd 
and covering_hl_rnd agents. This is not surprising because the covering_hl_lue agent 
moves about the graph predictably while the other two agents do not. 
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Figure 38 - General Effectiveness of Top Covering Agents Against all Adversaries 
By Graph 
To analyze the effect that graphs have on agent performance, the results from each 
game were grouped by graph and the general effectiveness against all adversaries were 
averaged. The analysis of the agents for the graphs are grouped into three categories: 
control agents, basic covering agents, and the top performing covering agents. The 
analysis shows that the top performing covering agents have both higher scores of 
general effectiveness as well are more consistent performance for all the graphs. 
When comparing the general effectiveness of the control agents, the control_plue 
and control_rnd agents perform about equally no matter graph is used (Figure 39). 
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However, the control_lue performs much better on the corridor graph than the others; it 
also tends to outperform the other control agents on all graphs except for graph A. 
 
Figure 39 - Control Agent General Effectiveness by Graph 
The basic covering agent strategies have the same general result, but with lower 
general effectiveness scores overall and a lower score specifically in the “Grid” graph 
(Figure 40). Thus, the control agent strategies perform better than the basic control 
agents, overall, regardless of the graph. Thus, there is a cost for the more complex 
behavior of the covering agents. However, it will be shown next that this cost is 
recovered and the general effectiveness scores are greatly increased when certain 
combinations of ECPs are used. 
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Figure 40 - Basic Covering Agent General Effectiveness by Graph 
The top performing covering agents have a very different performance characteristic 
than the control and basic covering agent strategies; they show very uniform and much 
improved performance no matter which graph is being used (Figure 41). One slight 
deviation is that the covering_hl_lue agent underperforms in the “A” graph (and to lesser 
extend the Islands, B, and Grid graphs) than the covering_hl_pb_rnd and 
covering_hl_rnd do. As a whole, though, these top performing covering agents handle 
each of the graphs extremely well, much better than the control and basic covering agent 
strategies. 
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Figure 41 - Top Covering Agent General Effectiveness by Graph 
Recommendations 
Limitations 
There are three major limitations in this work. The first limitation is that only four 
adversaries (random, waiting, statistical, and hybrid) were used. While the random, 
waiting, and statistical adversaries have their provenance in previous research (Sak, 
Wainer, & Goldenstein, 2008), other adversaries are possible that are more sophisticated 
than the random, waiting, statistical, and hybrid adversaries. The effectiveness of the 
proposed agent strategies against other adversary types has not been considered here. 
The second limitation is that other ECPs could be designed that perform better than 
the ones used in this work. Each ECP of this work have low time and space requirements, 
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basically linearly as a function of either the number of edges or critical vertices. Thus, 
these ECPs execute efficiently in terms of time and space. It is feasible that other ECPs 
could be designed that perform better though they may be less efficient. An example may 
be an ECP that uses neural networks to monitor their target vertex and learn when the 
most optimal time to attack is. 
The third limitation is the graphs. While the graphs are from previous research 
related to this problem (Almeida, et al., 2004), it is not well understood how agent 
performance depends on graph topology generally. The experiments have been limited to 
these select graphs. Questions of dependence of strategy effectiveness on graph topology 
has only been touched upon. 
Problem Variations 
 A potential variation of the problem is to limit the agents’ knowledge of the attack 
interval, K. In this work, the fixed attack interval was known to the agents. Instead, the 
attack interval would be given to the agents as a range as possible values, where each 
adversary’s attack interval lies within this range (the present research considers the trivial 
range [K, K]). The attack interval for an adversary 𝑎 is 𝐾(𝑎) ∈ [𝐾𝑙𝑜𝑤, 𝐾ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ], where 𝐾𝑙𝑜𝑤 
and 𝐾ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ are fixed values that the agents know (they are experimental settings). Hence 
the agent does not know exactly how long it has before a targeted vertex will be 
compromised, though this time period is constrained. In all the agent designs in this 
work, a notion of a return-to-vertex deadline was used to inform the agent when it should 
return to a vertex to minimize successful attacks on it. In some agents this is a hard 
deadline while in others it is soft. In either case, the agent is not sure of which timestep it 
must return to a critical vertex to thwart an attack on it.  
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When a hard deadline is required, such as against the waiting adversary, the agent 
must return to the vertex at the lower bound of the range, to be certain that an attack is 
thwarted. However, doing so will not give the agent any information regarding the attack 
interval 𝐾(𝑎) for adversary a. Instead, the agent maintains a range [𝐾𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝑎), 𝐾ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝑎)] 
for each adversary a that it covers and may use strategies to narrow this range. As it does 
so, it can hone itself to better protect the vertices of each adversary. This approach will 
cause at least one attack to succeed; the agent should find just one critical vertex and play 
this game against it alone until the value of K is known. After that, the agent can explore 
the graph and find other critical vertices. However, this approach is not as simple as it 
may seem because agents cannot stay on a vertex for succeeding time steps, an incident 
edge must always be chosen. Thus, the agent strategy must account for the edge weights 
to know the actual durations it may be away from a critical vertex. So, playing this game 
against a single adversary on a particular critical vertex will not necessarily make K 
known. It would, however, allow the range of values of K to be reduced in length after 
succeeding games against multiple adversaries at their critical vertices. Because no ECPs 
which used the soft deadline were used by the top performing agents, the implementation 
with soft deadlines will not be considered.  
Another problem variation is to further restrict the amount of communication 
between the agents. In this work, the only information that is shared between the agents 
are the critical vertices. This could be removed and replaced with a flag that an agent can 
leave at a critical vertex, which other agents take note of when arriving at that vertex. 
Thus, agents could only learn of new critical vertices by visiting a vertex and checking 
the flag. In practical terms, the original problem statement could be thought of each agent 
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broadcasting the critical vertices it has discovered by using electromagnetic emissions 
that are received by all agents as soon as a critical vertex is discovered. However, the 
assumption that this is possible in real world situations is not necessarily valid. Thus, in 
its place, physical markers could be left at vertices by the agents as they travel to them. 
The basic effect on the agents is the same, the agents learn of the critical vertices over 
time, but the rate at which they learn the critical vertices happens more slowly instead of 
instantaneously. This could have applications in practical scenarios such as when the 
graph is a computer network or a location where electromagnetic propagation is severely 
limited. 
A problem variation in the other direction than above is for agents to know the graph 
topology from the start as well as which vertex each agent is at for each timestep. 
However, no other information is shared such as the critical vertex set or any intentions 
of the other agents. Thus, the agents would not directly know which vertices are critical 
or covered by other agents, such as in this work. Instead, this information would have to 
be inferred by the agents, such as by monitoring the behavior of other agents. The agents 
could also patrol the graph to thwart attacks and gain direct knowledge of which vertices 
are critical and apply this knowledge to their inferences. It is interesting to consider that 
the agents would monitor each other to infer each other’s state and intentions and to 
cooperate effectively from the inferred knowledge. 
Summary 
This work on the domain of multi-agent adversarial patrol problems, which is 
applicable to interesting practical applications, resulted in the creation of novel agent 
strategies that outperform agent strategies of previous work. The information available to 
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the agents was purposely kept minimal, with the only shared information between them 
being the critical vertices. The agents had very limited access to the environment to 
reproduce the limited information that would be available to such agents in a practical 
setting. 
The goal of creating new heuristic agent strategies to counter each of the adversaries 
was achieved. Additionally, a new universal (or general) agent strategy was designed and 
found through experiments and analysis of results to be capable of countering all 
adversary types in the graphs that were considered. The three research questions were 
answered on how to develop effective agent strategies against each of the adversaries: 
that a general agent strategy could indeed be created, how these agents perform under a 
variety of conditions, and which agent strategies performed better and why. 
The methodology was derived directly from the research goals and questions, 
resulting in the design of three adversary strategies as well as a fourth that is hybrid of 
those three. This hybrid strategy is a new approach that drives more sophisticated agent 
strategy design. The problem formulation resulted in an approach to agent design that is 
based on a new chained component architecture, resulting in almost 200 new agent 
strategies by permutations of these components. Additionally, the new concept of agent 
critical vertex covering was introduced and designed into each of these new agent 
strategies. This covering capability allows the agent strategies to maximize protection of 
critical vertices while also maximizing patrolling for other vertices subject to attack in an 
efficient and emergent manner. 
The experiment design was created with inspiration from previous research in this 
problem domain, to provide a clear lineage of the significance of this work. New 
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performance metrics were created that provide better insight into the nature of an agent’s 
functioning under a very wide range of experiment scenarios. The wide range of 
experiment scenarios were broken down into sub-categories that enabled the results to be 
evaluated from many different viewpoints to provide insight under what conditions an 
agent does or does not perform well. To produce these results, millions of simulations 
were run, with each simulation having a duration of approximately tens of thousands of 
timesteps. The experiment took approximately 4 days to run a 32-core CPU machine; the 
experiment software was designed to execute in a highly parallel manner. 
Three categories of agent strategies were created: control, basic covering, and 
chained covering. The three control agent strategies were designed to counter the random, 
waiting, and statistical adversaries. The three basic covering strategies use critical vertex 
covering and consist of only a single terminal ECP; each basic covering agent designed to 
counter the random, waiting, and statistical adversaries. However, the basic covering 
strategies did perform as well as the control strategies. It appears that adding critical 
vertex covering with only a single terminal ECP shows no advantage and in fact is 
detrimental. Lastly, the almost 200 chained covering agent strategies, each one a 
permutation of all possible ECP combinations.  
Three of the chained covering agent strategies were notable as outperforming all 
others under all experimental variables. One of them was superior too all other agent 
strategies, including the control and basic covering ones. That agent strategy was 
covering_hl_pb_rnd, which is the chain of the following ECPs, in order: Hard-Limit, 
Peek-Back, and Random. This agent outperformed all other agents under the performance 
measures. It also performed roughly equally well no matter which adversary, graph, or 
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other experiment variables change. Thus, this agent strategy appears to be universal and 
consistently performant in all situations.
  
83 
 
Appendix A 
General Agent Strategy 
The General Agent strategy of this work was the agent composition of ECPs that 
outperformed all other agent strategies in terms of general effectiveness. This agent uses 
vertex covering to assign each critical vertex to exactly one agent. Each agent takes sole 
responsibility for protecting its own critical vertices and avoids the critical vertices of 
other agents. The General Agent Strategy is composed of a chain with the following 
ECPs, in order: Hard-Limit, Peek-Back, and Random. This particular combination of 
ECPs (in this specific order) performs the best against all the adversaries: random, 
waiting, statistical, and hybrid. When this agent arrives at a vertex and must choose an 
incident edge to travel to next, it first asks the Hard-Limit ECP to choose an edge. If the 
Hard-Limit ECP declines to choose an edge, the Peek-Back ECP is then asked to choose 
an edge. If it also declines to choose an edge, the Random ECP will always choose an 
edge. The combination of these three ECPs performed the best among all other 
permutations of ECPs. Each ECP will be given a brief description, below. 
The Hard-Limit ECP will only choose an edge if it heuristically determines that it 
must immediately begin travelling back to a covered vertex to reach it before K timesteps 
have elapsed since last leaving it. If that situation occurs, the ECP will pick the edge that 
will cause the agent to return to vertex the quickest. If there are multiple vertices that fit 
the criteria, it will pick the vertex that it can reach the soonest. If the criteria are not met, 
the Peek-Back ECP follows. 
The Peek-Back ECP will check every vertex once by departing it along an incident 
edge and then, after arriving at the other vertex, immediately return back to the original 
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vertex along the same edge. It does this to catch a waiting adversary in the act of 
attacking the vertex after leaving it. Once a vertex has been checked, it is never checked 
again and so if the agent travels to a checked vertex again in the future, the Random ECP 
follows. 
The Random ECP randomly picks an incident edge of the current vertex. However, it 
will avoid choosing an edge whose endpoint it knows to be a covered vertex of another 
agent. In the case where all incident edges have endpoints that go to a covered vertex of 
another agent, this ECP will choose one of them randomly. 
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